



Lying Through One's Nose:

On Masculine Sexuality and Deception in Collodi's *Pinocchio*

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ABSTRACT:

Lying Through One's Nose: On Male Sexuality and Deception – Abstract
This article considers Carlo Collodi's classic, *The Adventures of Pinocchio*, in terms of Lacanian psychoanalysis and the theoretical developments of French psychoanalyst Michèle Montrelay. While offering a Lacanian account of Pinocchio's tribulations, its major purpose is not to add to the store of usually anodyne psychoanalytic mappings of Collodi's plot, but to use Collodi's text to interrogate and precise the function of lying and deception in male sexuation: the crucial importance, for a man, of constructing the phantasy or fiction (and hence lie) of what Lacan calls a "logical instrument" made of parts and detached from his body – a psychic puppet – in order to be able to approach the other sex.

Keywords: Freud, Lacan, Michele Montrelay, Pinocchio, Masculine Sexuality, *l'appareillage*

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At the heart of a classic of children's literature, the hero, a humanoid puppet, responds to the prompting of the text's one female character, a blue Fairy, to tell the tale of his (mis)adventures. Whenever, in the course of recounting his tale, he tells a lie, his nose "which was already long," at once grows longer.¹ As the hero, in his "shame" (98) tries to avert his head, the growing nose collides with the bed in which he lies, the walls, the windowpane (99). It almost "stick[s] ... into] one of the Fairy's eyes, yet has grown so thick it cannot "pass through the door" (100). In the encounter with femininity, the tale's hero develops a growing nose as what we might, in psychoanalytical terms, call a body event.

This kernel event of Carlo Collodi's *Avventure di Pinocchio* evokes the unconscious metonymy of nose and penis which has a ramified legacy in psychoanalytic theory.² But why is the tale's evocation of this metonymy of infantile male sexuality simultaneous with its evocation of the linguistic operation of lying? And what might psychoanalytic theory have to learn from the literary fiction of *Pinocchio* about the relationship of masculine sexuality and the performativity of deception in speech? In this article, I offer some answers to these questions via a juxtaposition of Collodi's fictionalization of the rite of passage of a wooden puppet to a "boy, like all other boys" (264) with psychoanalytical accounts of the psychosexual saga of another little boy: Freud's case history of Little Hans as revisited by Lacan and psychoanalyst Michèle Montrelay. In so doing, I wish to suggest that Collodi's fiction of Pinocchio's growing nose is of interest to psychoanalytic theory because this fiction allows for the

interrogation and specification of a constitutive link between masculine sexuality and lying – which is not what Freudian accounts might make it seem.

In interrogating Collodi's text for what it might tell us about the role of lying in masculine sexuation, I am following a path somewhat different from that trodden by most previous commentators on the tale from a psychoanalytic perspective. As Jennifer Stone has pointed out in a magisterial article from 1994, "In Italy, Pinocchio is a staple for innumerable critics, writers, and psychoanalysts, all of whom try to carve out a niche in the vast literature of 'Pinocchiology'" (329). Where the vast majority of Pinocchologists cited by Stone "abide by humanistic values" and evince "a flight from the Oedipus into the defensive realms of anodyne childhood" (330) even as they cite Freud, Stone suggests a more rigorous Freudian reading which shows that "the vicissitudes of Pinocchio's adventurous libido in contest with his mortified ego" (329) in which perversity and the death drive make regular appearances are none other than the transmuting of the author's "infantile sufferings" into a tale of adventures (336) which far from treating the author's primordial trauma, choreograph his own death seen as "an expression of guilt about death wishes directed towards ... his father" (340). In the decades since, the cultural mechanism Stone calls Pinocchiology has not ceased to produce readings of the tale as a psychoanalytic *Bildungsroman* -- of the passage from the pleasure principle to the reality principle (West), from "'bad conscience' and 'bad guilt' to 'good conscience' and good guilt' (Zickler), from narcissism to "an identification with a loving father" who can function as an ego-ideal for the child (Nonnekes, 115), from an "infant object" to a humanized "infant subject" (Le Run), from the effects of a precocious trauma of maternal abandonment and paternal weakness to subjective autonomy achieved via a recovery

and introjection of a paternal figure (Novelino), or even, most recently, from ‘a state evocative of complete ‘autistic aloneness’ ... as the silent piece of wood’ to an “emerging capacity to mentalize” achieved via beneficent interactions (Smith, 277-278). Underlying all these translations of Collodi’s popular narrative into the terms of a psychoanalytic dynamic is Géza Róheim’s essay on *Pinocchio* as the story of a journey from the bundles of drives in which the Id in its most infantile forms struggles with a ferocious superego to an egoic adaptation to reality mediated by love. Roheim’s is one of the early instances of psychoanalytic Pinocchiology outside the Italian context mapped by Stone and the first instance of a study of the tale by a major psychoanalyst. What seems to have seduced psychoanalytic Pinocchologists since Róheim is the tale’s generic mixture of *Bildungsroman* and fairy tale which yields a narrative of misfortunes which find their resolution, readily mappable onto psychoanalysis’s own teleological narratives of subjective transitions and ameliorating transformations. As Stone suggests, however, this seduction comes at the price of sidestepping what Freud pointed to at the beyond of any contentment possibly achieved in psychic trajectories in or outside the clinic: the death drive and the perennial discontents involved in sexuality. If in what follows, I too delineate the wooden puppet’s narrative trajectory, this time in Lacanian terms, I do so not in order to add a Lacanian version to the vast literature of Pinocchiology but to use the tools of Lacanian analysis to interrogate Collodi’s narrative for a beyond of the pleasure principle that the tale’s teleological structure veils. The beyond in this instance concerns not the author’s Oedipal guilt and subsequent death wish mapped by Stone but a structural issue of male sexuation that helps precise the mechanisms of masculine sexuality as such: what is at stake for a man, in approaching a sexual partner, and why this has to do with a linguistic mechanism of lying.

In "Two Lies Told by Children," Freud suggests that infantile lies "occur under the influence of excessive feelings of love" for the parent of the opposite sex (305). If the linguistic operation of negation functions, Freud writes, as the "hall-mark of repression, a certificate of [unconscious] origin, like, let us say 'Made in Germany'" ("Negation" 236), the linguistic operation of the lie functions in a more specific way, as a rhetorical index of the presence of incestuous impulses which, in subjects of a neurotic structure, for the most part remain unconscious unless an analysis intervenes. Pinocchio's bed-scene with the Fairy, replete with lies, can hence be read in Freudian terms as a narrative screen which partly veils an incestuous unconscious scenario involving a mother figure (the blue Fairy) and a child (Pinocchio) whose growing nose is a metonym of the swelling, in this scenario, of the penis of the child who unconsciously wishes to outdo his father-rival.

In rhetorically marking nasal elongation as an index of a fundamentally Oedipal male rivalry phantasy, Collodi taps into the ancient tradition of the "long nose" as a gesture of scorn, whose psychoanalytical ramifications have been explored by Otto Fenichel. Fenichel teaches that although a male's making a "long nose" at another ostensibly attributes a long penis, an unconscious marker of potency, to the rival he wishes to shame, it ironically attributes to him at once a long penis and impotence, amounts to saying both "what a long penis you have!" and "but you are powerless!" (156-157). In narratively collocating the long nose with the rhetorical operation of the infantile lie, Collodi confirms what Fenichel and Freud suggest about these phenomena: their rootedness, for the boy, in an Oedipal phantasy which involves the uprooting of the father-rival. Interestingly, however, in Collodi's fiction the collocation of nasal

elongation and lying occurs in a scene from which the father is absent. The subtraction of the father from this scene in which Pinocchio, in bed, is alone with the blue Fairy, obviously accentuates the status of this scene as an Oedipal wish fulfillment. But perhaps another reason for the subtraction of the father from this scene is that, as I will argue, the link between masculine sexuality and deception, as it unfolds both in *Pinocchio* and in the case of Little Hans, is operative beyond Oedipality, as a constitutive component of what is at stake, for a man, in the sexual act.

Unlike Little Hans, who likes to cuddle with his mother in bed,³ Pinocchio is said never to have known his mother (57). Instead, the figure who occupies the structural place of what Lacan calls the desire of the mother (DM), capricious with respect to an infant not sufficiently separated from her⁴ is Pinocchio's male creator. In Lacanian terms, at the beginning of Collodi's narrative, Gepetto and Pinocchio are linked in a relation in which the child functions as the mother's phallus, but a female mother-figure is absent. So is a function which would come between the infant and the desire of the mother, rendering this desire enigmatic: what Lacan theorizes as the paternal function, the Name of the Father. Pinocchio, writes Pascal Le Malefan, is initially the "phallus-infant of a man who desires being a father and who *is* his actual father, without supporting the paternal function, [hence] desiring in a closed circuit" (114, my translation).

Hans's father too, Lacan says in his fifth seminar, fails to support the father function in the psychic economy of his son (*Formations of the Unconscious*, 152). So is Collodi's Gepetto -- witness his touching willingness, in the early stages of the

narrative, to fix Pinocchio's burnt legs (38), give Pinocchio the food he had saved for his own breakfast when Pinocchio cries of hunger (34), or sell his coat so that Pinocchio could go to school (61). But Gepetto fails to support the father function mostly because he does not establish for himself a focus of desire beyond the boy. He has no woman as sexual object. In this too he is somewhat like Hans's father, who, as Lacan points out in his rereading, does not sufficiently make his wife the mobilizer of his desire (*Formations of the Unconscious*, 176). Both in the case of Pinocchio and in the Hans case, the failure of the father's desire has devastating consequences for the son. The primordial father-son bond becomes not the substrate of subjectivation it might have been, but a symbiosis that threatens to swallow the nascent subject. In his seventeenth seminar, Lacan images this symbiosis as the jaws of a crocodile (129), but Collodi had already fictionalized it as the jaws of the sea-monster out of which both Gepetto and Pinocchio must find their way to psychic safety (242). In both cases, it is the son who supplements for the weakness of the father's desire, creating the father-function with his symptom.

Hans, Lacan says, is first "maintained in the position of a-subject (*assujet*).\" In Lacan's view, this is especially because of the failure, in Hans's case, of what Lacan in his fifth seminar calls the "third time" of the Oedipus complex. This "third time" is that permutation of the complex in which the father is revealed "as real and as a potent father," as the one who "has it" (the phallus), and can pass it on to his son as a deed that would eventually enable the son to approach a woman who is not the one prohibited to him (*Formations of the Unconscious*, 155). In view of this failure, it is Hans himself who inserts the father function into the imaginary dyads he forms both with his mother and with his father. He does this first in the paralyzing form of his

phobic symptom which, for all the suffering it causes in his life, has the metapsychological function of making use of the signifier "horse" to veil the holes in the Name of the Father in his psychic economy. Subsequently, so Lacan teaches, Hans constructs a father function for himself by means of the phantasy of the plumber who disassembles and reassembles the family's bathtub in which he is situated and in so doing equips him with a new "widdler" and "behind" (227). Similarly, in Collodi's text it is Pinocchio who inserts the father function into his psychic economy, first by the very action of fleeing Gepetto's house, site of the closed circuit of Gepetto's desire, then by forming a significant attachment to a figure who is outside the circuit of this desire, the blue Fairy.

What is psychoanalytically remarkable about Pinocchio's story, then, is the way in which this humanoid puppet, like Freud's Little Hans, conducts the psychic work of constructing a paternal metaphor for himself where the father function is faulty. He does so by forging a bond with the blue Fairy, object of the bed scene in which she displaces Gepetto's maternal position in his psychic economy.

At the same time, the very same literary figure of the blue Fairy occupies the function of a Name of the Father which comes between the mother and the child qua-phallus. She can fill this function for Pinocchio in that she articulates interdictions (against lying), embodies prohibition, the father's "no" (100). Even more significantly, the blue Fairy can enable paternal metaphorization for Pinocchio because unlike Gepetto, who dedicates his existence to the wooden puppet, she – at least initially -- has foci of desire outside of Pinocchio. Although Pinocchio is significant to her to the point she pines away and dies after he leaves her (134), when Pinocchio first comes across her,

her life is populated by a whole retinue of helpers (the eagle, the dog who drives the carriage, the raven doctor, the talking cricket) with whom she has object relations significant enough for those helpers to be completely devoted to her service (89). And does not her twice-repeated disappearance from Pinocchio's life after she is resurrected as his would-be mother (151), or appears in his dream to praise him for his good deeds (263) bespeak the *fort-da* rhythm of presence and absence which enables the child to attain what Freud in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* calls "the child's greatest cultural achievement" (17), the invention of the signifier as a presence made of absence? It is insofar as the mother can desire "'something other' [than the child] on the imaginary plane," Lacan says in *The Formations of the Unconscious*, that she opens up for the child the dimension of "primordial symbolization." (164). In Collodi's *Pinocchio*, the blue Fairy's libidinal investment in objects other than Pinocchio (the animals in her retinue) and her repeated disappearances from Pinocchio's life index her ability to function for Pinocchio not only as the object of heterosexual incestuous impulses, the female occupant of the function of the desire of the mother (DM) initially occupied only by Gepetto, but also as the substrate for a Name of the Father (NP), the function that beyond permitting nascent symbolization to subsist, would also orient symbolization and preclude its endless slippage among signifieds and senses such as is evidenced in cases of psychosis.

The blue Fairy, in short, occupies a pivotal and overdetermined role in Collodi's text both narratologically and psychoanalytically. In terms of formal narratology, the fairy who rescues Pinocchio after he is hung from a tree by the cat and fox dressed up as murderers (79) is the quintessential "donor" or mediator from the morphology of the folktale as detailed by Vladimir Propp. In bringing Pinocchio back to life, she is an

element which, as Frederic Jameson puts it in his analysis of Propp's narratology, "supplies a sufficiently asymmetrical force to make [the story] interesting to tell, and which is therefore somehow responsible for the 'storiness' of the story in the first place" (67). As Jameson points out, the very "asymmetrical force" of the donor underscores an "ontological weakness" on the part of the hero who is initially "not strong enough nor courageous enough" (67-68). In Collodi's text, the blue Fairy's function as the donor who rescues Pinocchio only underscores Pinocchio's lacks: in narratological terms, his inability to take care of himself and find his way in the world without getting into trouble; in psychoanalytical terms, the lack in his psychic economy both of a female occupant of the imaginary function of the desire of the mother and of the symbolic function of a Name of the Father, both of which the blue Fairy fulfills. What is important to note about Collodi's text from a Lacanian perspective, however, is that unlike the donors in many folktales and fairy tales (the fairy in Perrault's *Cinderella* would be a case in point), she does not completely appear *deus ex machina* to save the hero. Although what accounts for her appearance as donor in Collodi's text is not any action of Pinocchio's but the logic of storytelling Propp and Jameson allude to, Pinocchio is the agent responsible for converting her from mere donor to a pole of heteroerotic incestuous cathexes (sister and mother figure) that had hitherto been absent from his psychic economy. And, as I will show, it is he as nascent subject of the unconscious who makes use of her imposing of the interdiction (on lying) and her appearance and disappearance in his life to forge

Names of the Father for himself, first in the symptomatic form of his growing nose, later in the form of a phantasy crucial to masculine sexuality.

In Freudian terms, however, one can speak of the blue Fairy's incarnating not only the rhythm of the mother's coming and going requisite for the child's assumption of the ability to create *ex nihilo*, to symbolize presence out of absence, but at the same time the psychic function of what Freud in *The Project for a Scientific Psychology* calls the *proton pseudos*, the primordial lie (352-359). In the *Project*, Freud speaks of the *proton pseudos* a-propos of the metapsychology of the hysterical symptom, as manifest, for instance, in the case of Emma (the girl whose symptom was a phobia of entering clothes' shops). It consists, he says, of a "cathexis [of a memory trace] releasing unpleasure" in an unexpected way (358). In the case of Emma, the pre-Oedipal memory trace of going into a clothes shop and being touched under her clothes by one of the shopkeepers, initially cathected as pleasurable, is, once the interdictions on infantile sexuality attendant upon the Oedipal stage are in place, resignified as unpleasurable. It is as unpleasurable (a lie with respect to its initial cathexis as pleasurable) that the pre-Oedipal memory is joined on the basis of structural similarity to a later experience of being mocked in a clothes shop. The conjunction of these two unconscious representations, or in Lacanian terms, signifiers, one of them a lie, precipitates Emma's symptom. Emma's symptom, that is, has a lie at its logical origin.

When Lacan returns to Freud's *Entwurf* in his sixteenth seminar *From the Other to the other*, he conceptualizes the *proton pseudos* as more than a characteristic of the

hysteric's metapsychology. Like other components of what he comes to designate as the discourse of the hysteric, the *proton pseudos* becomes for Lacan a centerpiece of psychoanalytic knowledge about the structure of the subject. For Lacan, it is not only that the hysteric has pleasure disguised, lied about as unpleasure as the protasis of her symptom. Instead, the protatic function of the lie for the hysteric subject yields knowledge about its constitutive function in all subjects of the unconscious who are of a neurotic structure. In the *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, Lacan writes in his sixteenth seminar, "Freud designates what is involved in the unconscious concatenation as having its start in a *proton pseudos*, which can only be translated correctly, when one knows how to read, by the 'sovereign lie'" (lesson of 5 March, 1969). All unconscious concatenation, that is, all enchainments of repressed signifiers which, in neurotic subjects, are generative of symptoms, hinges upon a lie. In Collodi's text, the blue Fairy, insofar as, in narratological terms, she does not quite belong to Pinocchio's diegetic world, insofar as Pinocchio designates her as his sister and then his mother although she is neither in Collodi's fictional world, has the linguistic status of a lie. Just like the *proton pseudos* in the case of Freud's Emma, the blue Fairy as lie in Collodi's text has a pivotal function. Like any transitional object, she can be the site of multiple investments – the personae of the heteroerotic incestuous objects (sister and mother), the functions at once of the desire of the mother and of a name of the father. But in addition, she is generative of what functions in the text as yet another name of a father: Pinocchio's nose, which in the bed scene grows no longer unpredictably, as it does in the beginning of the narrative in a way that is reminiscent of the unpredictable erections that menace Freud's Hans, but in relation to her and the interdiction on lying she articulates. What this means, though, is that the blue Fairy plays a pivotal role in Collodi's *Adventures of Pinocchio*,

one connected with the establishment of the function of the Name of the Father, not just because she imposes an interdiction on lying a civilizing “no.” The blue Fairy plays such a pivotal role in Collodi's *Adventures of Pinocchio* because she herself occupies the very function of the lie she prohibits. For what is the corollary of the analogy between Collodi's text and Freud's case history of Little Hans if not that the lying prohibited in one is the analogue to the infantile masturbation fueled by incestuous phantasies prohibited in the other? To Little Hans, until the enunciation of his mother's interdiction on touching his penis lest she "send for Dr. A. to cut [it] off," his erections are an inexplicable real (7-8). The mother's interdiction in effect makes that part of the organism subjected to the unpredictable rhythm of tumescence and detumescence at once into an organ, part of the imaginary body, and into an erotogenic organ marked by a loss of jouissance.

If the interdiction on infantile masturbation such as articulated by Hans's mother precipitates the boy's penis as sexual organ rather than unpredictably changing organic substance similar to Pinocchio's nose at the beginning of Collodi's tale, the blue Fairy's interdiction on lying in this tale, structurally analogous to the interdictions uttered by Hans's mother, eroticizes the operation of lying. Perhaps, though, it would be more accurate to say that the blue Fairy's interdiction on lying accentuates the erotization of the lie – specifically the *proton pseudos* of the representation of pleasure as unpleasure -- in the very operation of the unconscious as detailed by Freud. Unconscious sexual life *is* the life of memory traces of incestuously motivated infantile sexual pleasure retroactively resignified as disgusting (in the case of the hysteric) or excessive (in the case of the obsessional) but in both cases, unpleasurable.⁵ It is, as Lacan puts it in his sixteenth seminar, a life that hinges on a

primal lie. In articulating the interdiction against lying, the blue Fairy in Collodi's text accentuates the necessity of such primal lies surrounding incestuous phantasies remaining unconscious. At the same time, in herself narratologically embodying the function of the lie she prohibits, the blue Fairy, at least partially a lie in terms of the ontology of the fictional world from which she repeatedly disappears, and for this very reason a creature of marvel around which Pinocchio's longings revolve, manifests the return of the repressed in the object of the phantasm's conscious layer.

The blue Fairy in Collodi's text, then, embodies as well as dialectically accentuates the originary function of the linguistic operation of the lie in the sexual reality of the unconscious. In this, though, the blue Fairy is a textual element whose structure is almost identical to that of its symptomatic precipitate: Pinocchio's growing nose. Growing in the aftermath of the interdiction on lying, Pinocchio's nose serves as a metonym for the male child's penis, which similarly grows once baptized a sexual organ by the interdiction on masturbation such as articulated by the mother in Freud's Hans case. In Lacan's terms, the growing of Pinocchio's nose when he utters lies when already subject to the blue Fairy's interdiction on lying bespeaks not only the erotization of the nose-qua-penis but also the concomitant operativity of the signifier that functions as a condition for such erotization, the phallus. The penis, Lacan says in his seminar on the *Formations of the Unconscious*, is initially "nothing other for the subject ... than a pleasure-point in his own body," a point that like Pinocchio's nose at the inception of Collodi's tale, generates pleasure in its unpredictable mutations. But because this organ is "much less subject to caducity than all the other elements which took on the role of signifier" (e.g. the oral or anal objects) it becomes, Lacan continues, when raised to the function of the master signifier, the phallus, the "hold of

the metaphorical chain in the paternal metaphor" and hence "an altogether central signifier of the unconscious" (471). As central, perhaps, as the lie, the *proton pseudos*. Both the *proton pseudos*, the pleasure mutated to unpleasure, and the phallus, the penis mutated from an organism's point of pleasure to master signifier, are, according to Lacan's analyses at different points in his seminar, central components of the sexual economy of the unconscious. Collodi's *Adventures of Pinocchio*, fictionally collocating lying and the phallic extension of Pinocchio's nose, precipitates an exposure of their common structure as cornerstones of the symbolic. Pinocchio's nose which grows when he utters lies when already subject to the blue Fairy's interdiction on lying, then, is not only a symptomatic and narratological precipitate of this interdiction. It is at the same time the structural equivalent of interdiction by virtue of its central role in the unconscious as an economy of signification.

Pinocchio's growing nose in Collodi's pivotal bed-scene, however, is the structural equivalent of the blue Fairy not only because, like the blue Fairy, it is a literary phenomenalization of a key component of the unconscious as an economy of representation, but at the same time because it is a phenomenalization of a particular key component of such an economy: a name of the father. The blue Fairy fills the function of a name of the father insofar as she breaks the closed circuit in which Pinocchio is sole object of Gepetto's desire, insofar as she articulates to Pinocchio an interdiction isomorphic with the interdiction on infantile masturbation which is a sublimated version of the interdiction on incest, and insofar as she comes and goes from Pinocchio's life, instituting the primordial rhythm of symbolization.

But the Name of the Father appears in Collodi's Pinocchio in another, less expected guise, as well. As Lacan puts it in his twenty-third seminar on *The Sinthome*, "the name of the father is also the father of the name – which makes the symptom no less necessary" (13). In Lacan's late teaching, that is, the Name of the Father is reconceptualized as the singular solution – the sinthome – which the subject forges for himself, fathers for himself, as his proper name. In the case of Joyce, this proper name is his art as at once his symptom and his version of the father, the version he himself created in the place of the father function lacking in his psychic economy. For Joyce, his literary art, especially in *Finnegan's Wake*, is not only his symptom qua *pereversion* (version of a father), but at the same time his sinthome, a symptom which yields a jouissance which does not serve the death drive.

Yet even a symptom which is not sinthomatic because it involves damage to the subject's life can be a solution generated in response to failures in the father function. In the case of Freud's Hans, the overdetermined phobic signifier of the horse functions as such a solution. In his return to the Hans case in the seminar on the *Relation to the Object*, Lacan explains that in Hans's psychic economy, the signifier "horse" is positioned as a veil over the hole in the unconscious that is the place of the (real) psychic cause, or in Freudian terms, the lost object. Hans's saying to his father that his phobia was precipitated "cos of the horse" [*Wegen dem Pferd*] is psychoanalytically precise not only because, as Freud notes, it points, through the homophony between "*Wegen*" (because) and "*Wagen*" (wagons or vehicles) to the extension of Hans's phobia from horses to furniture vans to buses (*Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy* 59). Hans's reference to causality (*Wegen*) is precise because it points to the psychic cause, the lost object, as the metapsychological core of the phobia, the

anxiety-inducing core which the phobic signifier (in this case, the horse) veils. Just as a cause in a logical syllogism pulls the apodosis (conclusion) after it, Lacan points out in his analysis of the Hans case, in Hans's phobia, the signifier "horse" veiling the psychic cause, pulls wagons, furniture vans, buses – the various vehicles onto which Hans's phobia expands – after it (*La relation d'objet* 317). Those vehicles, Lacan indicates, form a metonymic chain, but one of a peculiar nature, along which the "weight of sense" initially attached to the horse is loaded from one signifier onto another, just as the furniture is loaded onto a van, one of Hans's phobic objects (*La relation d'objet* 317, my translation). The sense thus metonymically loaded from one phobic signifier to another indeed weighs heavily, weighs with anxiety. Each metonym in Hans's expanding phobia is overdetermined with the senses of, Freud says, "hostile and jealous feelings towards his father, and sadistic impulses (premonitions, as it were, of copulation) towards his mother" (139). To these one may add anxieties of the potentially devouring body of his mother, imaged as giving birth (in German, *Niederkommen*, also falling) from which a father function does not sufficiently separate him, of the archaic homoerotic longings for his father, from which a father function does not sufficiently separate him either, and the unpredictable rise and fall rhythm of his erections.

But from whence the psychic necessity to create such a metonymic chain along which formidable semantic and psychic weight is made to glide, and place it, as Hans's causal phrase indicates, as an all-too-thin veil over the psychic cause, the lost object? As the preceding remarks suggest, what brings Hans's psychic economy all too close to this anxiogenic object-cause is the failings in the Name of the Father in his particular psychic economy. Hans's phobia, one may thus conclude, is a symptom his

psyche generates in response to these failings (or holes) in the Name of the Father. Hans's phobia is a prosthetic solution his psyche generates, albeit one which comes at the heavy price of his almost complete immobilization.

Pinocchio's symptom, his growing nose, is no less overdetermined than Hans's chain of phobic signifiers, and is similar in psychic function. As argued above, Pinocchio's familial constellation generates too close a primal bonding between father and son which, in the absence of a separating Name of the Father, might be generative of anxieties of the paternal body as devouring. At the same time, Pinocchio's interpolation of the blue Fairy as a female occupant of the function of the desire of the mother in his psychic economy Oedipalizes this economy. The blue Fairy then becomes an object of incestuous longing. And just as in the case of Hans, the masturbation which makes Pinocchio's penis grow is a source not only of gratification, but – precisely because of the intensity of this gratification, Freud says – also of disgust (136), in the case of Pinocchio, the growth of the nose, a penile metonym, is a source of an affect close to disgust and as related to sexual cathexis, shame (92).

What might allay the unpleasurable affects besetting Pinocchio would be a father function which would come between Pinocchio and the objects from which he is not sufficiently separated (Gepetto and then the blue Fairy), especially the father of what Lacan in his fifth seminar calls the third time of the Oedipus Complex, the potent father who has (the phallus). Hans's father fails in the third time of the Oedipus, Lacan implies, because he does not seem to be a potent sexual partner in his relation with his wife (*Formations of the Unconscious*, 177). Gepetto fails in this third time not

because he does not have a sexual partner, but also because throughout Collodi's narrative he is presented as ineffectual – witness his impotence to rescue himself from the body of the whale (206), in stark contrast to Pinocchio. He lacks, in other words, the insignia of masculinity (of which sexual prowess is one) which might mark him, for Pinocchio, as a father who "has" the phallus, a father such as the son might one day become. Pinocchio thus suffers from a hole in the Name of the Father no less, if not more, than Hans.

Given this hole in the Name of the Father, the multiple anxieties plaguing Pinocchio are not dissipated but erupt in the symptom of his growing nose. This symptom is somatic, involving a displacement of cathexis from the genitals to a non-genital organ, and might hence seem conversive or hysterical in nature. Nevertheless, Pinocchio's symptom bespeaks the same metapsychological structure as Hans's phobia: a veil to the holes in the Name of the Father. Its effects, too, mark it as phobic. In his discussion of the Hans case, Freud notes the content of Hans's phobia "was such as to impose a very great measure of restriction upon his freedom of movement, and that was its purpose" (139). This restriction of locomotion is necessary because locomotion is psychically associated, for Hans, with the movements of his penis and with the locomotion attendant upon the forbidden (incestuous) sexual act around which his unconscious phantasies revolve. Pinocchio's symptom too functions as a restrictor of movement. When Pinocchio's nose grows, he is unable to turn in his bed or pass through the door (92).

What distinguishes Pinocchio's symptom from Hans's, then, is not its clinical structure. It is its signifying structure. If Hans's symptomatology, as Lacan shows in his fourth seminar, evinces the structure of a textual line, a metonymic chain whose

substrate is displacement, Pinocchio's symptom evinces the structure of condensation: unlike Hans's, Pinocchio's overdetermined anxieties are not displaced from one signifier veiling the hole of the psychic cause to another with which it is linked by causal relations (like horse and wagon). They are all concentrated on the one signifier of the nose, itself a metonym for the penis. As a symptomatic condensator of anxiety which limits Pinocchio's locomotion, however, his long nose functions as does Hans's phobia: a *suppleance* for what fails in the father function, generated by the psyche at the price of a jouissance the subject experiences as affliction. Hence Pinocchio's "cries and screams" when he discovers his nose cannot "pass through the door of the room" (93).

Pinocchio's long nose symptom appears under the linguistic condition of the lie. To the extent Pinocchio's long nose symptom is not only, like Hans's phobia, a prosthesis for what does not work in the father function, but one specifically linked with male sexuality, one may say that Collodi's text offers a literary theorization of the connection between male sexuality and deception. The movements of the nose-qua-penis as sexual organ (subject to interdiction) rather than organic substance outside language as it is at the beginning of the tale, hinge on the articulation of a lie, suggesting an inherent link between male sexuality as well as unconscious life in general, and deception.

And yet Collodi's *Adventures of Pinocchio* has even more to suggest about the conceptual links between male sexuality and deception, especially in the unraveling of its plot. As this plot draws to a close, Pinocchio's long nose symptom disappears, much as does Hans's phobia towards the end of Freud's case history. What accounts for the disappearance of symptoms, in both cases, is a phantasy. In Freud's analysis,

the phantasy in question has to do with Hans's one day becoming a man like his father and "experiencing the pleasure of giving birth to [children] and the pleasure ... of looking after them" (133). In Lacan's return to the Hans case, however, he puts more emphasis on Hans's phantasies of the plumber who disassembles and reassembles the bath in which Hans is sitting (65-66), or who unscrews his "widdler" and "behind" and screws on new ones (98), phantasies which Freud marginalizes, saying they "merely served Hans as a starting point from which to continue giving information" and otherwise "elude ... interpretation" (128). For Lacan, the significance of the plumber phantasies is that they serve as the point for the mutation of the penis into the master signifier of the phallus. In the second plumber phantasy, according to Lacan, the plumber removes Hans's real sexual organ, and fits him with a mechanical apparatus which can be replaced, an apparatus which can thus be described as subject to the laws of symbolic exchange, the laws of the signifier (366).

The latter part of Collodi's *Pinocchio* too involves a phantasy – an enacted phantasy – which involves substitution and (literally) restores motion where the phobic symptom had hitherto decreed immobility. This is the enacted phantasy of Pinocchio's rescue of Gepetto from the belly of the Dog-fish (240-252), an adventure teeming with trials and tribulations such as a green sea monster who threatens to roast him (241). At the conclusion of this phantasy, Pinocchio, having brought his father onto safety on shore (254), embarks on a life of providing for his father (252-265). In this enacted phantasy, Pinocchio, previously immobilized by his somatic symptom, changes places with his father. Before leaping from the mouth of the sea-Dog, Pinocchio says to Gepetto: "get on my shoulders, and put your arms tight round my neck. I will take care of all the rest" (251). Just as in Hans's plumber phantasy as read by Lacan, a symbolic substitution takes place wherein the penis mutates to a signifier, a

substitutable element in a system of exchange, in Collodi's text there is a symbolic substitution wherein a humanoid puppet changes places with his father: from the child the father Gepetto has to save when his feet get burnt (33) he becomes his father's rescuer, assumes a symbolic function in a male lineage.

The enacted phantasy at the end of Collodi's *Adventures of Pinocchio* has all the makings not only of the mutation of a real element into an exchangeable component in a symbolic system such as Lacan detects in Hans's plumber phantasies. It also has the makings of a father-rescue phantasy as detailed by Freud in "A Special Type of Object Choice Made by Men" (172-174). In such phantasies, Freud says, a child, in "rescuing his father from danger and saving his life" puts "his account square" with his father, to whom he has heard he owes his life. Freud's account of the father-rescue phantasy as a son's squaring of accounts with a father-figure to whom life and subsistence are owed is concurrent with the details of Collodi's text, where Pinocchio speaks early on of his sense of debt to a father so ready to make "sacrifices" for the sake of his son's well-being (44). However, phantasies of rescuing a father such as Pinocchio enacts may also be thought as connected, as Freud puts it, to the "parental complex" (172) in that they appease a sense of guilt attendant upon parricidal impulses towards the father-rival such as are indexed in Collodi's text in the implicit inscription of Gepetto as the addressee of Pinocchio's long-nose qua archaic gesture of derision.

Pinocchio's enacted rescue phantasy of Gepetto, then, may function as a compensation for parricidal impulses towards him as Oedipal rival from the moment he installs the blue Fairy as virtual mother. But whether the function of this phantasy is compensation for Oedipal guilt or only the son's setting of accounts with the

father, what is clear is that this phantasy makes a difference for the psychic economy of place in Collodi's tale, just as Hans's plumber phantasies institute a change in Hans's hitherto phobic space.

What characterizes a phobic space? In her return to the Hans case in *L'ombre et le nom*, Psychoanalyst Michele Montrelay precises: "in a phobic space, one may circulate without difficulty, except that all of a sudden the ground gapes beneath one's feet. The only choice one has is to stop short, to freeze, like a statue" (91, my translation). The very purpose of Hans's symptom as Freud understands it is indeed to restrict movement (139). This necessity to restrict movement in phobia is not only the result, as Freud suggests, of the association of movement with forbidden (incestuous) copulation phantasies which plague the phobic child (139). Lacan's close analysis of the map sketches included in Freud's case history in his fourth seminar suggests that phobia is a psychic constellation that involves a special relation to space, a relation in which, if one follows Montrelay's account of Lacan's reading, space at once permits free and easy circulation and threatens at any moment to collapse into an abyss.

What might account for this paradoxical organization of space in phobia such as is manifest in the case of Hans and also, I argue, in the case of Pinocchio? Lacan's theorization of the relation between space and the Name of the Father in his third seminar suggests an answer. In lesson twenty-three of his third seminar (284-294), Lacan compares the function of the Name of the Father in the psychic economy to the function of the highway in geography and cartography. "What happens," Lacan asks, "when we don't have a highway and we are forced to combine minor paths ... with one another when we go from one point to another? To go from this point to that point we shall have a choice between different components of the network" (292). "Several

things," Lacan adds, "can be deduced from this, "which explain Schreber's delusion to us" (229). But those things that can be deduced also help explain Hans's phobia, to which Lacan turns his attention the following year. The case where the Name of the Father is totally lacking, as it is in the Schreber case, is analogous, Lacan implies, to a case where there is no highway whatsoever (293-294). The case of Hans is not one where the highway is completely lacking. The main streets of Vienna are clearly marked in the sketch of the environs of Hans's home (46) and in his verbal accounts. However, the failures or holes in the Name of the Father in Hans's psychic economy precipitate isomorphic holes in the mental representations of these streets. It is as a veil for these holes in the Name of the Father that manifest themselves as potential swallowing holes in the urban space of Vienna that Hans's psyche generates the signifier "horse" and the metonyms onto which it expands, before which Hans freezes in terror, hence also protected from the danger of falling into a psychic abyss.

Pinocchio too is immobilized, or more precisely, restricted by his initial symptom (the growing nose which prevents him from turning around in bed or leaving his room), hence the inflection of this symptom as phobic. But Pinocchio's relation to space is more complex than that of Freud's Hans, and not as univocally distinct from that of Freud's Schreber. Like the traveler who cannot make use of a highway, Lacan's structural analogue for the psychotic, Collodi's Pinocchio tries to find his way in the world without map or main road, propelled by his drives from the house of his father into the streets. Yet everywhere he roams, he meets what seems an accident, or in Lacan's terms a *tyche* point, an encounter with the real where something goes wrong (*The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* 54). A hole into which he falls. Sometimes this hole dons the phenomenal veil of a theatre-master who wishes to burn him as firewood (54). Another time it appears in the guise of the murderers the

cunning tricksters (the fox and cat) who tempt him to follow them to the miraculous land of Owls (66); and lastly, the hole appears in the guise of the donkey-owner who entices children into "toyland" only to turn them into donkeys who serve him or whom he sells to a circus-master (213-233) who in turn sells Pinocchio to a person who wishes to skin him so as to make a drum (223). In psychoanalytical terms, what these repeated *tyche* points demonstrate is neither Pinocchio's misfortune nor his just punishment for his childish misdemeanors, but what Pascal Le Malefan calls his "permanent disorientation" (121). Those encounters with the real, Le Malefan explains, "betray the absence of a precise direction" such as a well-operating phallic function or Name of the Father might have provided Pinocchio (121). In terms of the analyses of Lacan and Montrelay, one might say that these *tyche* points are the points in his geographic-qua-psyche trajectory which phenomenalize the holes in Pinocchio's Name-of-the-Father. Pinocchio, that is, is clinically different from Hans whose phobic signifiers, positioned over the holes in his Name of the Father which phenomenalize themselves as the holes in the otherwise hospitable streets of Vienna which threaten to open up beneath his feet, prevent him from falling even as they immobilize him. Initially much more disoriented than Hans, Pinocchio falls into these holes in his psychic space, with no signifier to place over them at his psychic disposal save at the moment of his bed-scene encounter with the blue Fairy which precipitates his own phobic signifier, the growing nose.

The bed scene with its precipitation of the long nose qua symptom has a singular status in Collodi's text also because it is the one instance wherein, in metapsychological terms, a signifier coupled with jouissance veils what might otherwise have been a hole into which Pinocchio falls as he does in other of the text's kernel events. The disorientation, the absence of a sufficient vectorization by a Name

of the Father, is much more marked in the case of Pinocchio than in the case of Hans. Indeed, as Le Malefan notes, disorientation is inscribed in Pinocchio's name, which in Italian means "the eye of a pine-nut," evoking the many "eyes" with which the fruit of a pine tree is surrounded on all sides, and hence "an unquiet gaze, at once attentive and naïve, which looks in all directions at once" (121). In the Disney version, Pinocchio's disoriented gaze is accentuated by the "graphism of the puppet's face, whose expressions betray the absence of a precise direction" (121). So pronounced is Pinocchio's disorientation, mark of a failure in phallic vectorization, in Collodi's text and its Disney version that Le Malefan concludes that Pinocchio is in a "position of pre-psychosis," a diagnosis strengthened, for him, by Pinocchio's initial lack of ears (Collodi 23), which makes him reminiscent of a "psychotic child, immured in his silence" (Le Malefan 121). And yet despite the absence of a mental cartography such as Hans's, on which main streets are marked, bespeaking something of a paternal orientation given from the outset and hence pointing to a neurotic structure, Pinocchio is able to forge for himself a phobic symptom which makes it possible for the disoriented psychic space in which he circulates and constantly falls to congeal into immobility, to turn into a phobic space – at least for a while, for the duration of the bed-scene. What saves Pinocchio from a state of pre-psychosis, then, is the long nose qua phobic symptom. And what saves him, in turn, from the immobilization phobia entail is a phantasy, in itself a fiction and hence in logical terms a falsehood or lie.

Pinocchio's trajectory, that is, can be described as metapsychologically situated between two lies. One is the lies he articulates to the blue Fairy despite her interdiction, the lies that in terms of the logic of narrative, precipitate his long nose, the phobic symptom which saves him, at least temporarily, by veiling at least one of these holes in the function of the Name of the Father he encounters on his disoriented

way. The second lie is the lie of phantasy, the psychic fabric he weaves to cover all of these holes. Collodi's text makes the structure of this phantasy, and its relation to masculine sexuality, quite clear.

Collodi's *Adventures of Pinocchio* ends with a *denouement* in which Pinocchio finally becomes a "bright, intelligent boy" (264) who looks at the wooden puppet not as his own specular body image but as an object detached from his body: "a big puppet leaning against a chair, with its head on one side, its arms dangling, and its legs ... crossed and bent " (265), made up of parts whose distinctness from one another is accentuated (head, dangling arms, folded legs mounted of parts). This image of an apparatus detached from the body of a male and itself made up of parts is an example of the phantasy Michèle Montrelay, in her rereadings of Lacan's return to Freud's Hans case posits as fundamental to male sexuality, the phantasy of the detachable part(s). This is the phantasy of an apparatus made of parts which can be disassembled and reassembled, just like the bath and Hans's private parts in Hans's plumber phantasies. The point in Hans's plumber phantasies, for Montrelay, is not, as for Lacan, only the mutation of the penis from organ to signifier (the phallus). It is weaving of a fabric of phantasy wherein what was initially anxiety-inducing (the imaginary body of the mother as devouring, Hans's body which unpredictable changes as a result of sexual stimulation) is dissected into parts and put together again in a new way. In the plumber phantasies, the mother, qua bathtub,

unglued from her too immediate and too threatening reality ... is thus changed into a mere element of a set, the set of mobile, detachable, spare parts that belong to the plumber's trade. A ball among others, says Lacan, that would roll, following the same rules as the others, as part of

a large game, in which the introduction of other balls would be enough to modify trajectories and positions. Transferred to such a terrain, the mother loses her absolute power, and as a result no longer terrifies. Sex may also be posited without danger ("Why did you tell me ... " 219).

Similarly, Hans's penis, also the source of anxieties for him, becomes, in the second plumber phantasy where it is screwed off and replaced, "an element of the ... plumbing set (in which containers, pipes and faucets represent the body, but in a male, *technicalized* manner ("Why did you tell me" 219). "Thus transformed," Monrely concludes, "Hans and his mother, their bodies and their respective sex organs, get closer, turn into opposites and are gradually differentiated without danger. The tone of Little Hans's speech changes. Anxiety is replaced by humour" ("Why did you tell me ..." 219).

What makes this phantasy of disassembly and reassembly a lie so necessary for the management of anxieties accruing to male sexuality such as plague Hans? More, Monrely suggests in "L'appareillage," than the specifics of the Hans case. In "L'appareillage," Monrely reads Hans's plumber phantasies as paradigmatic of what she calls "a specifically masculine imaginary" ("L'appareillage" 36). This imaginary, which the phantasy of disassembly and reassembly structures, she argues, is made necessary by anxieties precipitated by the phenomenology of the sexual act for a man:

ceaselessly, throughout his life, the male subject subtends the fact that he loses, that he gives of his sperm ... which in perpetuating the species, no longer has anything to do with the person who had been its carrier. What will become of this semen, what will the person receiving it do with it?

Of this question no man who runs the risk of the sexual act can ever become the master ("L'appareillage" 38, my translation).

The masculine imaginary, the paradigmatic phantasy of a detachable part which can be disassembled and reassembled such as manifest in Hans's plumber phantasies, Montrelay continues, "has as its function the deployment and marking out of a possible space in which ejaculation would not destroy the subject" ("L'appareillage" 38, my translation). For Montrelay, the French word "*l'appareillage*," which means at once "instrument" "set of instruments," "preparations for launching (a ship)" and the "casting off" of a ship to sea, captures the multiple meanings at play in this fundamental male phantasy ("L'appareillage, 36-37, my translation).

It is with such a phantasy of an apparatus made up of parts (legs, thighs, arms, head) which can be fitted together but taken apart, that Collodi's text ends. This is in marked contrast to its inception with an image of a piece of wood that behaves like an organic substance which moves and emits sounds (13-14). If throughout the tale, Pinocchio is a puppet subject to tribulations of a perverse edge which seem analogues of the fluctuations of desire and thought affecting the male organ (Montrelay, *L'ombre et le nom*, 151, my translation), at its end he is in the position of one who has the puppet. In Lacanian terms, he has the apparatus requisite for regulating jouissance – the phallus as a "logical instrument" assembled from the debris of the Oedipus and castrations complexes once these are shattered upon the subjective registration of castration (*La relation d'objet*, lesson of 27 March, 1957). The phallus as logical instrument made of parts is "the virtual title," Lacan says, "to having what the father has," – to keep in his pocket and put to use at a later time and with a woman who is not his mother (*Formations of the Unconscious*, 187-179).

Having acquired this phantasy of the apparatus made of detachable parts Pinocchio at the end of Collodi's tale evinces another form of deception necessary to male sexuality. This is no longer the lying through one's nose – phobic, albeit indicative in its predication on a lie, of the functioning of the unconscious – wherein a metonym of the penis grows whenever the linguistic condition of a lie is fulfilled. It is the lie of the phantasy of the detachable part. This lie is isomorphic with the *proton pseudos*, the lie which institutes the unconscious, in that it too institutes truth. But the truth which the male phantasy qua lie institutes is different. Insofar as the *proton pseudos* institutes the unconscious it institutes the truth of desire. Insofar as the male phantasy of detachable parts, as detailed by Montrelay, enables a man a relation to the real of the sexual act in such a way that does not entail the anxiety of blowing himself loose, it is a lie that institutes the truth of a male subject's *jouissance*. It is the “puppet” a man must psychically construct if he is to be able to sexually approach a woman without this experience arousing too many traumas, too many anxieties, too many defences.

If Sophocles's Antigone as Lacan analyzes her in his seventh seminar traverses a liminal zone between two deaths and in doing so, precipitates beauty (*Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 246) Collodi's Pinocchio traverses a liminal zone between two lies: the lie instituting the unconscious truth of the subject's *jouissance* and the lie of the *appareillage* instituting a livable relation to the real of male sexuality. The traversal of this liminal zone by Pinocchio's desire to forge for himself a name of the father where such a function is lacking to him, the parallel, in Collodi's text, to Antigone's non-dialectizable desire to bury her brother, precipitates what one might call, after Lacan's analysis of *Antigone*, the aesthetic fascination this text has exerted on generations of readers, and, following the Disney version, viewers, negotiating their

relation to the impossible question posed by the real of their male sexuality. And the women negotiating the impossibility of the sexual relation with men. If they care to.

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¹ Collodi, Carlo. (1911). *Pinocchio*. Trans. M.A. Murray. Chapel Hill, NC: Yesterday's Classics, 2009, 98. All further references are to this edition and will be incorporated in the text.

² For instance, in his 1927 essay on "Fetishism," Freud traces the genesis of a "shine on the nose" (in German '*Glanz auf der Nase*') as a male analysand's erotic condition to a double displacement, involving the invocatory and scopophilic drives, from the craving for a glance on the penis (152). In another instance of the psychoanalytic genealogy of the nose-penis metonym, Karl Abraham speaks of neurotic substitutive formations effected when "the libido for some reason or other has to turn away from the genital zone it is attracted to certain other erotogenic zones," wherein "the nose acquires the significance of a surrogate of the male genital" (351).

³ Freud, Sigmund. (1909). *Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy*. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. James Strachey. London: Vintage, 2001. Volume 10, 23. All further references to the Hans case are to this edition and will be incorporated in the text.

⁴ My account of the child's relation with the function Lacan terms the desire of the mother (DM), in which the child is identified with what, for the mother, functions as the phallus and hence the answer to the question of what the mother wants is based on the lessons of 5 and December, 1956, of Lacan's fourth seminar, *La relation d'objet*. As Lacan explains in this seminar as well in *The Formations of the Unconscious* (145-162), the Name of the Father (NP) is the function that intervenes between mother and child, rendering the mother's desire enigmatic for the child.

⁵ On the difference between the hysterical and the obsessional modes of resignifying representations of infantile sexual pleasure see Soler's article on "Hysteria and Obsession."